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Abstract
This paper argues that the choice between free banking and central bank
NGDP targeting is a difficult to answer empirical question, contrary to the
position of those on either side of the debate. Public choice concerns, the
lack of the signals of profit and loss, and optimal determination of currency
areas are points against any form of central banking. However, free banking
may be suboptimal relative to central bank NGDP targeting for three
reasons explored here. Until more data become available, it is impossible to
gauge the relative importance of one set of these tradeoffs against the other.
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I. Introduction
As the Great Recession continued, some of the most ardent
supporters of the free market began entertaining the possibility that
“demand-side” problems were causing persistent unemployment.
Although the right-wing press has criticized the untraditional
behavior of central banks, monetary policy actually appeared tight by
the standard set forth by one of the most eminent and stringent
inflation hawks of the 20th century, F.A. Hayek. This standard
requires constant total overall spending in the economy (Hayek,
1931; White, 1999). This implies that M*V should be kept at a
constant level for money to remain “neutral.” Following the equation
of exchange, this is in effect the same as a Nominal Gross Domestic
Product (NGDP) target of 0%. For the first time in many years,
NGDP fell in the United States, suggesting that money may have
been too tight from the standpoint of even Hayek.
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A number of economists have pointed out that NGDP was
allowed to fall during the recession. Modern mainstream
macroeconomists had taken some version of NGDP targeting
seriously in the past, albeit with a target greater than 0% (e.g., Hall
and Mankiw, 1994; see Frankel, 2012 for an informal literature
review). Many prominent economists and commentators have since
come out in favor of this policy objective in place of other targets for
central banks (Woodford, 2012; Romer, 2011; Cowen, 2011;
Krugman, 2011; Goldman Sachs [Goldstein, 2011]; Barro, 2012;
Avent, 2011). Meanwhile, many advocates of free markets coalesced
around this policy objective as a solution to aggregate demand
deficiencies that did not resort to fiscal policy. This latter position,
led primarily by economist Scott Sumner, became known as market
monetarism.
Meanwhile, modern followers of Hayek had moved in an entirely
different direction prior to the crisis arising in the first place.
Concerned with a central bank’s ability to possess the necessary
information and incentives to perform effective monetary policy, this
group identified an alternative institutional framework that would not
succumb to those problems. By deregulating banks and the supply of
money, competitive pressures would constrain private banks in such
a way that their note issue would follow a logic consistent with
consumer demands for money. This institutional arrangement,
known as “free banking,” would yield an approximation of NGDP
targeting—a “productivity norm” (Selgin, 1997)—that has many
similarities to the policy Hayek originally envisioned.
Early on in the Great Recession, the Cato Institute sponsored a
symposium intended for the public that allowed Sumner (before the
phrase “market monetarism” was coined) to present his position that
money was too tight to an audience that would typically believe the
opposite (Sumner, 2009). Among those responding to his position
were free banking advocates taking notice of how similar the two
schools of thought were. For example, “Scott Sumner's general views
on macroeconomics are so much in harmony with my own that, in
commenting on the present essay, I'm hard pressed to steer clear of
the Scylla of fulsomeness without being drawn into a Charybdis of
pettifoggery” (Selgin, 2009). This paper can be seen as a continuation
of this exchange but from a slightly different perspective. Instead of
determining what monetary policy is optimal to escape the Great
Recession, I wish to contrast the effectiveness of free banking and
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central bank NGDP targeting in overcoming obstacles to minimizing
long-run unemployment.
There are a number of well-honed objections to central banking
from the standpoint of the Hayekians, the best three of which I will
discuss. Objections to free banking, especially for those who take the
concerns of Hayekians very seriously, are less common; objections to
free banking typically involve attempting to pull the rug out from
under it using standard market failure arguments. In place of that,
this paper seeks to identify issues in optimally targeting NGDP that
would arise under free banking but not under central banking. The
disagreement then devolves into a set of empirical questions that are
difficult to answer satisfactorily.
Part II will review the standard objections to central bank NGDP
targeting. Part III will provide what I believe are legitimate concerns
in the efficacy of the free banking system. Part IV will offer
interpretation and policy prescription. Part V concludes.
II. Objections to Central Bank NGDP Targeting
There are three traditional economic objections to central
banking made by proponents of free banking. One, although
economists may have an ideal monetary policy, central bankers have
their own sets of incentives. Two, central banks, because they are a
top-down mechanism, lack the information a market setting provides.
Three, central banks have no way of determining the optimal
currency area, and the size of the currency area in practice is merely
determined by arbitrary political boundaries. In these ways free
banking is superior to any policy for central banks.
1. Public Choice
What economists believe a central bank should do and what
central banks do in practice are two different things. Famously,
Arthur F. Burns was notorious for caving in to political pressure
from Richard Nixon, who pressed for monetary stimulus in time for
the 1972 election. The field of public choice within economics
acknowledges that government officials and bureaucrats are human
beings, and whatever assumptions we make about individuals acting
on the market and within government should be symmetrical
(Brennan and Buchanan, 2000, pp. 53–75). If economists assume
narrowly defined self-interest when it comes to the behavior of
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financial institutions, they should assume narrowly defined selfinterest when it comes to central bankers.
Good outcomes in central banking require that the central
bankers possess a certain public-spiritedness, the correct ideology, or
a desire to be well-liked among economists. Otherwise, a narrow
utility maximizer will take advantage of the powers of central banks
(Wagner, 1986; White, 1988; see especially Boettke and Smith, 2012).
Advocates of free banking make no such assumption about
individuals in their banking system. It is driven entirely by the signals
of profit and loss. In assuming one of the very dangers of central
banking, free banking advocates are able to show how their system
will still work. On this margin, free banking is far more robust than
central banking.
2. The Knowledge Problem
Central banks lack the knowledge requisite for optimal
macroeconomic outcomes (Butos, 1986; Selgin, 1988, pp. 89–94; see
also Hayek, 1978). Assume away all public choice issues mentioned
above. In that case, one would still be left a bureaucracy hoping it is
doing more good than harm. The situation is as Mises described the
behavior of bureaucracy (1944). Even if we have altruistic central
bankers, they will still possess less knowledge than a system of profit
and loss would provide.
This may sound like making a mountain out of a molehill,
because Western central banks have the most sophisticated modeling
devices in the world available to them. Here is an example that will
appeal to most economists’ intuitions. What is the better mechanism
for determining what the price of an orange should be, a
sophisticated computer model or supply and demand? Most
economists would probably say supply and demand.1 Another set of
prices on the market are interest rates. In manipulating the supply of
money, the central bank in effect sets the price of all of these interest
rates. Free banking proposes that we instead allow these prices to be
determined by supply and demand.
One counterargument to this is that the central bank can use a
futures market to determine what the market expects the path of
NGDP to be (Sumner, 2011a). Under this proposed regime, the
1
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government subsidizes into existence an NGDP futures market with
which it directs monetary policy. This may be an improvement over
modeling. However, this assumes the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH), and it is unclear whether EMH is still a mainstream position.
Because it assumes markets are in equilibrium, it is certainly
antithetical to how most free banking proponents view the way
economies function (Pasour, 1989). Although prediction markets
incorporate some dispersed knowledge, they are no substitutes for
unhindered market institutions developed via the competitive
process.
3. The Scope of the Currency
Local economies may be over- or under-shooting their monetary
equilibrium at any given moment, relative to the economy overall
(Mundell, 1961; Beckworth, 2010). Unfortunately, a central bank
charged with adjusting an economy the size of the United States has
very blunt tools to perform that function. The path of NGDP for the
whole of the United States may be too low, but in specific regions it
may be too high. Using a top-down approach, there are significant
barriers to determining with any accuracy the size of optimal currency
areas. In free banking, this would be done automatically as individuals
weigh tradeoffs implicit in their choice of competing banknotes.
Supply and demand would in turn offer a tendency toward an
optimal equilibrium for the geographical scope of a currency, as
opposed to allowing it to be determined by the vagaries of politics.
Given the tradeoffs now made obvious by the euro, this issue should
not be dismissed as a concern of secondary importance.
III. Objections to Free Banking
There are certain problems faced by free banking that are not
faced by central banks. Central banks have more straightforward
mechanisms for curtailing the effects of expansionary central banks
outside their currency area. Central banks would also be able to
increase the NGDP target should it be the case that the productivity
norm provides too little inflation to achieve full employment. Certain
(though perhaps not most) consumers may also choose forms of
money and banking that do not follow the logic of free banking, and
this may adversely affect the ability of the free banking system to
reliably achieve its implicit target.
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1. Non-Neutral Injections from Foreign Central Banks
International economics has been briefly discussed2 in the free
banking literature, but I believe it understates how damaging the
presence of outside central banks is to an economy with free banking.
Currency devaluation by foreign central banks may push the free
banking system off the optimal path for NGDP growth. The
intention, after all, of currency devaluation is to improve the balance
of payments by increasing exports and decreasing imports. Some of
the increase in exports would likely be purchased by individuals in the
free banking zone, and NGDP will grow faster than optimal. It is
possible that this will be mediated by exchange rates, but it is unclear
if it will; it depends on elasticities.
If devaluation by foreign central banks has no effect on trade
balances and it is perfectly mediated via the exchange rates, this
means that the “Marshall-Lerner condition” does not hold (see
Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, pp. 457–59). As long as the price
elasticities of exports and imports are greater than one, it will
improve the trade balance of the country which devalues. Modern
literature has established firmer microfoundations for why this is
true, such as local costs driving a wedge between prices and imported
costs (Burstein et al., 2003), oligopolistic markets (Atkeson and
Burstein, 2008), and price rigidity (Bacchetta and van Wincoop,
2003).
Let MF and VF represent the money issued by banks inside
the free banking system. Let MZ and VZ represent the money issued
by foreign central banks that effectively contributes to NGDP within
the currency area (whether directly by individuals or indirectly
through financial markets). Finally, let PF/Z represent the exchange
rate between the two types of currencies. Then,
NGDP = MFVF + MZVZPF/Z.
If MZ increases as a result of currency devaluation, MF would
need not fall in lockstep to counteract the injection in currency, as
there is no profit incentive for the unregulated banks to behave that
way. Furthermore, financial markets may not adjust such that PF/Z
2
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falls so as to guarantee that NGDP returns to its optimal growth rate;
again, that depends on elasticities. This means that the productivity
norm will not be maintained unless the elasticities are just right.
Once NGDP is pushed off the optimal path, the pernicious
effects of an oversupply of money may occur, whether that means
monetary disequilibrium, the Keynesian “overheating” story, or
Austrian business cycle (Horwitz, 2000). However, this would not
have happened under a central bank targeting NGDP. It would
observe the increase in NGDP and contract the money supply to
counteract it. These concerns are not idle musings, either; foreign
lending causing excessive expansion has a classic example in
Thailand’s 1997 crisis. The central bank was behaving reasonably well
by central banking standards (though not targeting NGDP), but
loanable funds were flooding in from other nations anxious to lend.
If Thailand’s central bank had been targeting NGDP, there is no
reason why this would have happened (Christensen, 2012b).
2. Pathological Wage Stickiness
Modern economists believe that a little bit of inflation is good,
and not because it is desirable to continually try subverting
expectations. They believe there are structural and pathological issues
that are simplified when the value of currency is continuously
declining. “We know wages are extremely sticky, we just don’t know
why,” writes Sumner (2011b). If this is true—and it is a widely held
view among economists—then the case for the pure productivity
norm is weakened.3 Even if, on average, wages stay the same,
employers will struggle to reduce the wages of those whose
productivity deserves a wage cut. Although Selgin (1997) has
addressed many of these issues, and he has dismissed the idea that
inflation is necessary for full employment as “dubious” (1988, p.
150), alternative expositions of this argument maintain academic
respectability. The more modern perspective, articulated for instance
by Christiano et al. (2005), Akerlof et al. (1996), Card and Hyslop
(1997), and Kahn (1997), is more resistant to Selgin’s responses.
As Selgin argues, if 0% inflation is sufficient to avert
unemployment caused by wage stickiness, then 1% deflation will not
cause unemployment when it coincides with a 1% increase in
3
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productivity. Overall consumer prices will fall and wages will stay
constant. But this is not the issue that modern wage stickiness is
about. If agents are identical and there is no need to shift workers
between industries, a productivity norm will work. But once we need
to reallocate workers between different industries, wages in certain
industries would need to rise while others fall. Their proposed
solution is to continually pump inflation into the economy (although
obviously not at an increasing rate) so that workers may be reallocated
between industries using price signals without requiring certain
individuals’ wages to fall.
There are two interpretations to this issue, if modern wage
stickiness is correct. Perhaps economies may not “overheat” until a
certain rate of inflation associated with full employment is reached,
even in the long run. Alternatively, the economy may achieve
sustainable growth only at very low levels of inflation (or, per Selgin,
deflation), but the money illusion still causes unemployment at these
low levels of inflation.
In the latter interpretation, effectively there is a tradeoff between
unemployment caused by the business cycle and unemployment
caused by the money illusion. If one targets inflation to eliminate the
money illusion, unemployment in years 1 to 4 may be 5%, 5%, 5%,
and 10%. If one suppresses inflation as extensively as Selgin
recommends, unemployment in years 1 to 4 may be 7%, 7%, 7%, and
7%. It is not clear which of these two states of the world is better.
Furthermore, by jiggering those values around in a way that maintains
the intuition and stays in the realm of reasonability, we can find a
situation in which it is clearly better to have low unemployment
normally, with the occasional business cycle, than it is to eliminate
the business cycle.4 With a central bank, we can reach a possibly
desirable higher NGDP target than we would under free banking if
modern wage stickiness is in fact right. It is unclear what mechanism
would allow us to reach it under free banking.
3. Market Demand for Confounding Forms of Money and Banking
Selgin (1988) and Selgin and White (1994) have argued, using
both theory and historical case studies, that the unregulated market
4
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would employ the type of free banking system they specify in their
work. Free banking scholars have used a conjectural history of
banking systems in the absence of government regulation, employing
accounts of many nearly unregulated banking systems as a guide.
They fault the work of other scholars investigating unregulated
banking systems for being flatly ahistorical:
The value of [studies of unregulated payment systems] is
limited, however, by their authors’ use of ad hoc assumptions,
ranging from the proliferation of competing fiat currencies at
one extreme to the complete absence of money at the other.
To be really useful in interpreting the effects of regulation in
the past, or in predicting the consequences of deregulation in
the future, a theory of unregulated banking should be based
on realistic assumptions drawn, if possible, from actual
experience. (Selgin, 1988, p. 16, emphasis in original)
The historical tendency toward the use of the system they specify is
not what is disputed. Instead, a portion of the supply of money may
be fulfilled via institutions outside the free banking system. Although
free banking theorists have demonstrated that unregulated currency
areas have tended toward free banking, they have not demonstrated
that 100% of money will be supplied using these means. Perhaps
0.01%, 10%, or 50% of money will be supplied using alternatives; we
just do not know.
Financial instruments are regularly invented in modern
economies, many of which often behave “like” money. And we
should not forget that economists are unable to draw bright lines as
to what even constitutes money. Even if we believe that notes that
fall under the aegis of a free banking regime will completely dominate
typical transactions (thereby entirely granting the free banking
historical argument), other forms of payment may play significant
roles (as they do today) in financial transactions. These free market
alternatives (again, some of which are used today) to free banking
include:
1. Money-less payment systems, i.e., the original intention of Paypal.
Such systems may develop their own institutional rules governing
their currencies, but if they do not use base “outside” money,
they will not have the profit motive to target NGDP.
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2. The BFH system (Greenfield and Yeager, 1983), which targets
the value of a pool of goods and services.
3. Bitcoins, an online currency of which there will eventually be a
static total of 21 million units (Lowenthal, 2011). These could be
potentially used as base money in the free banking system, but
they could also follow another rule, such as inflation targeting.
4. More “traditional” currencies that consciously target inflation
(Klein, 1974; Hayek, 1976).
5. Local currencies intending to keep production localized (Swann
and Witt, 1997; Pacione, 1997). The most prominent of these
currencies, the Berkshares, presently pegs exchange rates, but
there is talk of pegging it to the value of local commodities
(O’Brien, 2011).
6. 100% reserve commodity banking, under which the money
supply grows only if more of the commodity is produced.
These systems of payment may not be a significant portion of the
market, but they could be. And regardless of how small a part of the
market they take up, their presence inhibits the ability of the free
banking system to attain a productivity norm in equilibrium. For
instance, if 25% of the market uses inflation-targeting currencies, the
economy overall will overshoot the productivity norm. Free
banking’s clearinghouse mechanism has no discernible reason to
incentivize banks to contract their quantity of inside money in
response to the overshooting.
An NGDP-targeting central bank would be able to solve this by
forcing more money or pulling it out to counteract the effects of
these parallel regimes. There is no theoretical reason why firms
operating under a free banking regime would have the profit motive
to do so. Whether this an important or an insignificant issue in
practice, the NGDP-targeting central bank would eliminate it,
whereas under free banking deviations from the productivity norm
may persist indefinitely.
IV. Implications and Policy Prescription
The magnitudes of each of these concerns are empirical
questions. However, because the problems with NGDP targeting are
also present under status quo monetary policy, both market
monetarists and free bankers should prefer NGDP targeting over
status quo. Still, it is difficult to imagine fixing the fundamental
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problems with central banking. No amount of rule setting offers the
same discipline the market does. Public choice problems will always
remain no matter how angelic we hope bureaucrats will one day
become. In contrast, the potential problems with free banking are
“mere” questions of magnitude in the sense that we just do not have
a very good idea about how important they would really be under
free banking in modern economies. We also are in no position to
know that entrepreneurs will be unable to “get around” these issues.
As such, it is reasonable to consider free banking as an ideal, if
utopian goal. For now, however, NGDP targeting is an important
step in getting there, if only as part of a grander “privatization
strategy” (Christensen, 2011) (see Table 1).
Because we lack many modern examples of free banking, it is
difficult to determine the relative magnitudes of these problems
under each of the institutional arrangements. Although all economists
may have their priors regarding the importance of each problem,
what is most needed is more experimentation and data—in Hayek’s
words, “tinkering.” If NGDP targeting is implemented, different
Western nations should experiment with different targets. Some
nations should experiment with a very low target, including zero. At
that point, we will begin having stronger evidence of whether or not
wage stickiness is the type of problem some economists insist it is.
A small country such as Singapore or Hong Kong may be the
best starting point for performing a full experiment with free
banking. It may be necessary, however, for the government to first
institute rather draconian capital controls to ensure that excessive
foreign loanable funds do not enter the country. If and when the
Table 1: Summary of Tradeoffs
for Central Bank NGDP Targeting and Free Banking

Incentives
Knowledge problems
Optimized currency area
Non-neutral injections from
foreign central banks
Pathological wage stickiness
Market demand for other
institutional arrangements

NGDP-Targeting
Central Bank
–
–
–
+

Free
Banking
+
+
+
–

+
+

–
–
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supremacy of free banking is demonstrated on all margins except
international trade, one could then remove the capital controls and
see if issues then arise.
V. Conclusion
There are good arguments questioning both central bank NGDP
targeting and free banking. Incentives and information (in both the
Hayekian sense and in determining the optimal currency area) are
excellent reasons why we should relegate the supply of currency to a
system governed by profit and loss. But there are at least three
confounding issues that seem to be better solved through central
banks. Of course, the strengths of entrepreneurship and the market
in general are that they discover solutions where the blackboard may
tell us not to expect solutions. That is why it is desirable to see the
elimination of the central bank as an ideal to tinker toward, but at the
same time it is extremely undesirable to lose sight of the clear
superiority of NGDP targeting to the present system. Furthermore,
free banking advocates must take these issues seriously, and until
scholarship shows otherwise, the efficacy of free banking versus an
NGDP targeting central bank is an empirical question, and an
empirical question for which there is little empirical evidence.
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